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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff - Respondent, 
vs. 
MICHAEL JOSEPH JIMINEZ, 
Defendant - Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
15776 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Defendant was charged in a Criminal Information 
signed by Assistant Attorney General, Robert Wallace with 
the offense of theft in violation of Utah Code Annotated 
76-6-405 (Supp. 1977), for obtaining or exercising control 
of the property of Alpha Distributing by deception and with 
a purpose to deprive Alpha Distributing of its property. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The jury found the defendant guilty of the offense and 
the defendant was sentenced on April 11, 1978, by Judge 
Dean Conder to an indeterminate term of one to fifteen years 
in the Utah State Prison. Both the District Court and the 
Utah Supreme Court refused to enter a Certificate of Probable 
Cause staying the execution of the commitment. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks a reversal of the order of the 
lower Court refusing to quash the Information and an order 
of this Court declaring that the trial Court was without 
jurisdiction and the judgment entered is void; or, in the 
alternative an order awarding the appellant a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Information filed and issued in the Third District 
Court was signed by Robert Wallace, as Assistant Attorney 
General on behalf of Robert Hansen. (R. ) . The Salt Lake 
County Attorney did not sign or file the Information. The 
entire proceedings in this case from the original Complaint 
to and including the trial was prosecuted by the Utah Attcrru 
General's Office. 
The first witness at the trial was Anthony Escobar, t~ 
President of Alpha Distributing Company and President of 
Inter American Development. (T.27). He was also the sole 
owner of Inter American Development, a corporation without 
a board of directors or any other stockholders (T.27). Mr. 
Escobar first met the defendant on the first of June 1976 (T. 
when Mr. Escobar approached Mr. Jiminez about taking over 
a bankrupt professional soccer team the "Golden Spikers" 
(T.84). The defendant at the time was an officer in Tri 
Delta Corporation and entered into some discussion with Mr. 
Escobar about the acquisition of the professional soccer 
-2-
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franchise by frontier, U.S.A., a corporation controlled by 
Tri Delta Corporation (T.88,37). 
According to Mr. Escobar, an oral agreement was entered 
into between Alpha Distributing and the defendant on behalf 
of Tri Delta Corporation to transfer all of the assets of 
Alpha Distributing to Frontier, U.S.A., in exchange for 
which Anthony Escobar would become President of Alpha Dis-
tributing Co., Vice-President of Frontier, U.S.A., and stock-
holder in Frontier, U.S.A. (T.32,88). 
Prior to the oral agreement there was discussion and 
negotiations between the defendant on behalf of Frontier 
U.S.A. and Anthony Escobar. (T.86). On direct examination, 
Mr. Escobar stated that Mr. Jiminez made certain representa-
tions to him (T.18). He stated Mr. Jiminez said that he was 
the chairman of the board of Tri Delta Corporation, a multi-
million dollar conglomerate, that Frontier U.S.A. 's stock 
was trading at $5.00 per share, that he had millions of 
dollars of Exxon and Phillips Petroleum oil stocks at his 
disposal through a company called Kimberly Beers, that he was 
the owner of Continental Bank and Trust Company, that he was 
owner of a bank in Idaho, that he owned a company called 
"Zero Cold" and that he had a project known as "White Barns" 
(T.19-21). He was also given proforma financial statements 
for Tri Delta and frontier, U.S.A. (T.21, States Exhibit 2). 
On cross examination, Mr. Escobar stated that he didn't 
check on any of these statements or representations prior to 
making the oral agreement (T.91). He also said that he 
-3-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
understood that the term "pro forma" was used in the finan-
cial statements meant the potential of the companies or wha~ 
could be done given the right circumstances (T.95). 
Mr. Escobar stated that the defendant, Mr. Jiminez on 
behalf of Frontier U.S.A. paid to the soccer team $10,000.00 
in the form of a cashier's check which was deposited in the 
account of Tri Delta Corporation (T. 120). Out of this 
account and the account of Alpha Distributing Co., Mr. 
Escobar paid the expenses incurred by the soccer team. (T.~ 
62, States Exhibit 5). The soccer team which was known as 
the "Utah Pioneers" played four games in 1976 and made the 
league play offs (T.85). Other than the payment of $10, 
Mr. Jiminez incurred additional obligations in the amounts 
of $4,400.00 and $8,000.00 in relation to expenditures for 
the soccer team (T.244). The evidence also showed that Mr. 
Escobar received a salary from Alpha Distributing during 
July and August of approximately $3,000.00 and the use of 
a Lincoln Mark IV (T.146). 
Lyle Jenkins, an employee of Alpha Distributing, testi-
fied that Mr. Jiminez stated in his presence that he was the 
owner of "Zero Corporation" and Frontier U.S.A. (T .164). He 
also recalled Mr. Jiminez stating that he was "in hopes of 
pulling together an exclusive franchise by acquiring the 
Pioneer Soccer Team ... " and substantial sums of money into 
Alpha Distributing (T.164). After Mr. Escobar had resigned 
and abandoned his position with Alpha Distributing, Mr. 
Jenkins called Mr. Jiminez seeking some assistance as to 
-4-
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what tc do with the company (T.173). In November, 1976, 
Lyle Jenkins sent $1,000.00 to Mr. Jiminez after disposing 
of certain assets (T.169). At the time of forwarding this 
money, Mr. Jenkins recalled that he discussed obtaining an 
attorney with Mr. Jiminez (T.174). Mr. Jiminez stated that 
this money was given to an attorney (T.250). 
The State introduced the testimony of several witnesses 
in relationship to the representations made to Mr. Escobar; 
Fred Jensen, Robert Phillips, Keith Downs, Burt Elg, John 
Kelly, Conrad Scheidell, and Emerson Burgess. 
The defendant, Michael Jiminez took the stand in his own 
behalf (T. 233 to T. 279). He testified that he was Vice-
President and Chairman of the Board of Tri Delta Corporation 
and that Tri Delta Corporation had an interest in Frontier 
U.S.A. (T.236). He stated that the business of Tri Delta 
Corporation was to be a representative under a finder's fee 
arrangement to obtain borrowers in obtaining collateral. 
He stated that he did not have anything to do with the day to 
day operation of the team and that he had signed all the checks 
on the joint account in blank before he returned to California 
(T.240). 
Mr. Jiminez said that Tri Delta Corporation had trans-
ferred $4,400.00 to Kimberly Beers, a New York Corporation 
to obtain collateral for the purpose of borrowing the $38,000.00 
necessary to pay the soccer team franchise (T.241). Subse-
quent to this agreement, Mr. Jiminez learned that Kimberly 
-5-
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Beers wasn't going to honor this agreement and Frontier 
U.S.A. was unable to obtain the franchise (T.243). 
He stated that there was never a formal consumated 
merger between Tri Delta Corporation and Alpha Distributi~ I 
Co. and that the matter was merely under discussion by the 
two corporations (T.247). He stated that Tri Delta Corpon-
tion made an investigation of Mr. Escobar's Corporation, 
Alpha Distributing and found that the debts far exceeded 
their assets (T.249). 
Mr. Jiminez or Tri Delta Corporation never personally [ 
received any money funds or property from Alpha Distributi~ 
Co. (T.252). He also explained that he never indicated to 
Mr. Escobar that he owned any of the property as Mr. Esco-
bar claimed that he did but was negotiating with several 
of those businesses (T.251 - T.256). 
After the conviction, the appellant filed a complaint ! 
for Writ of Habeas Corpus in Third Judicial District Court 
action No. 31004 claiming that the plaintiff was being held 
in custody pursuant to a void Information. On May 11, 1978 
Judge Peter F. Leary dismissed the complaint for a Writ of 
Habeas Corpus on the grounds that this present appeal was 
pending. 
I 
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL DID NOT HAVE AUTHORITY TO FILE 
THE INFORMATION AND TO PROSECUTE PUBLIC OFFENSES IN SALT 
LAKE COUNTY. 
The appellant was arraigned on August 5, 1977 in the 
-6-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Third Judicial District Court and entered a plea of not 
guilty. The Information was filed and signed by Robert 
R. Wallace, Assistant Attorney General, on behalf of Robert 
B. Hansen, Attorney General and was not officially authorized 
by the Salt Lake County Attorney. 
On February 24, 1978, after the attorney representing 
the appellant at the time of arraignment had withdrawn, the 
new attorney for the appellant filed a Motion to Quash the 
Information on the grounds the prosecutor had no authority 
to file the Information. The Motion was denied on March 1, 
1978, by the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, on the basis that 
the Motion was not timely filed with the Court 's required 
by Utah Code Annotated 77-16-2 and 77-23-10 (1953). 
On March 6, 1978 the defendant was tried before a jury 
in an action prosecuted by Robert R. Wallace, Assistant 
Attorney General. Prior to the trial, the attorney for the 
appellant moved the Court to dismiss the action on the 
ground that the Attorney General had no authority to act 
as a public prosecutor. This Motion was also denied by the 
trial Court. 
The power and authority of public prosecutor is vested 
solely in the office of the County Attorney bu virtue of Utah 
Code Annotated 17-18-1 (1953), which was enacted in 197. 
That section states: 
"17-18-1. Powers--Duties--Prohibitions.--
The county attorney is a public prosecutor 
and must: 
(1) Conduct on behalf of the state all 
-7-
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prosecutions for public offenses committed 
within his county, except for misdemeanor 
prosecutions under city or town ordinances 
and appeals therefrom. 
(3) The county attorney shall, when it does 
not conflict with other official duties, 
attend to all legal business required of 
him in his county by the attorney general, 
without charge, when the interests of the 
state are involved. All the duties and 
powers of public prosecutor shall be as-
sumed and discharged by the county attorney. 
The county attorney shall appear and prosecute 
for the state in the district court of his 
county in all criminal prosecutions, and may 
be interested and render such assistance as 
may be required by the attorney general in 
all such cases that may be appealed to the 
Supreme Court; he shall attend the deliber-
ations of the grand jury; he shall draw all 
indictments and informations for offenses 
against the laws of this state within his 
county and shall cause all persons indicted or 
informed against to be speedily arraigned. 
(14) If at any time, after investigation, 
by and a finding and recommendation from the 
district judge involved, that the county 
attorney in any county is unable to satis-
factorily and adequately perform his duties 
in prosecuting a criminal case without ad-
ditional legal assistance, the attorney 
general shall provide such additional 
assistance." 
In addition, the Code of Criminal Procedure places up~ 
the County Attorney the authority to file Informations and 
additional duties and responsibilities concerning the 
decision to file an Information. Utah Code Annotated 
77-17-1 and 77-17-2 (Supp. 1977). 
A review of Section 17-18-1 discloses that the legislature 
took into account the Attorney General's Office is setting 
up the system of prosecuting public offenses in Utah. Sub-
section (14) of that statute sets forth conditions precedenc 
to the involvement of the Attorney General's Office; The 
-8-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
district court judge must first make an investigation and 
a finding and recommendation that the county attorney is 
unable to satisfactorily and adequately perform his legal 
duties in prosecuting a criminal case without additional 
legal assistance. Utah Code Annotated, 17-18-1 (14)(1953). 
The authority and power of the Attorney General in 
relationship to the County Attorney has been faced by the 
courts of several neighboring states. 
In State v. Woodahl, 495 P. 2d 182 (Mont. 1972), attorney 
in Montana must conduct all prosecutions and file and sign 
all Informations and the Attorney General did not have any 
such power. This decision was based upon Secti~n 16-3101 
of the Montana Code which is set forth in the opinion and 
which is substantially similar to Utah Code Annotated 17-18-1. 
In Woodahl, the Montana Supreme Court overruled the 
contention that the Attorney General has any common law 
power to file Informations. The Court held that the statute 
vesting authority in the County Attorney to file Informations 
expressly supercedes and abrogates any common law power of 
the Attorney General. 
In relationship to the power of the Attorney General to 
supervise the County Attorney the Court stated: 
"This opinion is not to be construed as 
any limitation on the supervisory powers 
and control of the Attorney General over 
the County Attorneys of this state as pro-
vided by law. This opinion simply holds 
that under the facts and circumstances 
here, the Attorney General has no legal 
power to file an Information signed only 
by himself or to institute a criminal felony 
prosecution in the District Court independent 
of the County Attorney." Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In~ v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 503 P. 2d 
892 (Nev. 1972) the Nevada Supreme Court reached a similar 
result on this issue in a habeas corpus action. The Court 
held that the Attorney General's Information was void for 
lack of jurisdiction and discharged the defendant from 
custody. The Court stated: 
"Indeed our statutory scheme invests 
control of the Information process 
in the District Attorney to the exclusion of 
others. The legislature wisely has 
forbidden dual control. For example, 
NRS 173.045(1) provides that all In-
formations shall be filed by the 
District Attorney. He may elect not 
to file an Information after a preliminary 
examination has occurred and the accused 
has been held to answer, but must give 
his reasons in writing for not doing 
so. NRS 173.055(2) ... These provisions 
declare the legislative purpose to grant 
the District Attorney of the proper county 
control over the Information process. 
The Attorney General is not mentioned, 
and the conclusion is inevitable that 
he simply is not empowered to initiate 
a prosecution by Information independent 
of the District Attorney." 
In the opinion in Ryan, the Nevada Court found that the po1w 
to "supervise" the District Attorney which the Nevada statute\ 
:::::b:: ::• r:::o::•: :::::·:;·::::: ::p:::::'::, •::n:::::t I 
of the District Attorney." The Court held that the Attornev [ 
General's power to commence or defend a suit applies only 
in the civil area and does not include the prosecution of 
criminal cases. Thus the Nevada Court rejected the same 
arguments which are being made in the present case by the 
Utah Attorney General. 
-10- l 
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The Colorado Courts have reached a similar result. 
People Ex Rel Witcher v. District Court, 549 P. 2d 778 
(Colo. 1976) and Tooely vs. District Court, 549 P. 2d 774 
(Colo 1976). 
The appellant respectfully submits that the power and 
authority over the informational process in the State of 
Utah has been vested by the legislature with the County 
Attorney and excludes any involvement by the Attorney General 
except if the requirements of Section 17-18-1 are met. In 
the present case, the trial court did not make any finding 
or recommendation that the County Attorney was unable to 
satisfactorily or adequately perform his duties. There is 
no explanation in the record why this public offense was not 
prosecuted by the County Attorney of Salt Lake County rather 
than before Attorney General. The Attorney General did not 
have any authority to file the Information either under 
Utah Constitution Article VII, Section 18 or Utah Code 
Annotated 67-5-1 (1953). The power to file Information has 
been expressly and specifically granted exclusively to the 
off ice of County Attorney by virtue of Utah Code Annotated 
17-18-1 (1953). 
II 
THE INFORMATION FILED BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL HAS NO 
FORCE AND EFFECT AND THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THE 
APPELLANT WAIVED THE JURISDICTIONAL DEFECT. 
The lower Court ruled that the Information was valid 
because any objection to it was waived not because of any 
-11-
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finding that the Attorney General had the power to file 
the Information. Notwithstanding the fact that the 
defendant-appellant had retained new counsel after the 
arraignment, the lower Court found that the objections con-
cerning the Information had been waived because not pre-
sented at the arraignment. 
The appellant contends that the Information is the on~, 
pleading filed in a criminal case which gives the Court 
jurisdiction over the defendant and the subject matter of 
the action. The authority for this proposition is found in 
two early Utah cases, State v. Beddo, 22 Utah 432, 63 P. 96 
(1900) and Connors v. Pratt, 28 Utah 258, 112 P. 399 (1910). 
In State v. Beddo, 2 2 Utah 432, 63 P. 96 (1900) , the 
defendant was convicted in a prosecution conducted under 
our Information filed by the District Attorney under author!: 
of Chapter 56 of the laws of 1899 and not the County AttornEI 
The Court found that the law enabling the District' Attorney 
to file the Information was unconstitutionally passed by t~ 
legislature and that the District Attorney, whose office 
was created by the act, had no power to sign and file the 
Information. The Court then held that since the proper 
official, the County Attorney, had not signed and filed the 
Information under which the defendant was prosecuted, the le; 
Court had no jurisdiction to try the case and the convictiOO 
and sentence were void. 
Ten years later in the case of Connors v. Pratt, 28 
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basis of an Information filed by the District Attorney 
filed a Writ of Habeas Corpus. Following the authority of 
State v. Beddo, the Utah Supreme Court held the Information 
was void and of no force and effect because it was not signed 
by the County Attorney. The Court then found that the 
petitioner was released from any legal restraint imposed 
by such a void commitment. 
The remaining question is whether the appellant waived 
his right to contest the jurisdictional defect of the void 
Information by not raising the matter at the time of the 
entry of his plea. 
Utah Code Annotated 77-23-10 (1953) which deals with 
the effect of a failure to make a timely Motion to 
Quash specifically provides that all objections which are 
grounds for a Motion in Arrest of Judgment are not waived 
by raising these objections at the time of arraignment. 
In State v. Merritt, 247 P. 497 (1926) the Utah Supreme 
Court stated that defects in the Information is jurisdictional 
matter and properly a subject of a Motion in Arrest of Judg-
ment. In this decision, the Supreme Court cited State v. 
Beddo for the proposition that jurisdictional issues could 
be raised at any time. 
Thus the appellant submits that this matter is not sub-
ject to being waived under 77-23-10 because of the juris-
dictional nature of the objection. 
In addition, Rule 12(h) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, incorporated by Rule 8l(e) provides that sub-
-13-
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ject matter jurisdiction is never waived. Because the 
Information is the only pleading giving the Court subject 
matter jurisdiction, the Court acquires no jurisdiction 
to try a criminal action under a void Information. 
As this Court found in Hakki v. Faux, 16 ~tah 2d 132, ~ 
396 P. 2d 867 (1964), if the proper procedure 1s not follo~ 
for invoking the jurisdiction of the Court, the Court is 
powerless to act in the matter. 
The appellant submits that because the Attorney Genen: 
did not have the power to file the Information, the lower 
Court erred in not dismissing and quashing the Information 
improperly filed in this matter. 
III 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING THE APPELLANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS THE INFORMATION BECAUSE THE STATE FAILED 
TO PROVE ALL OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE. 
The appellant made a motion at the close of the case 
in chief by the State to dismiss the Information (T.229). 
The trial Court denied this motion (T.230). 
In State v. Nuttal, 16 Utah 2d 171, 397 P. 2d 797 (196L, 
this Court reversed a conviction of obtaining property by ~J 
pretenses charged under Utah Code Annotated 76-20-8 (re-
pealed 1973). The Court in carefully reviewing the facts 
in that decision found that the alleged victim did not 
suffer actual loss and reversed the conviction in the lower 
Court. As in the present case, the facts involved concernec, 
a business transaction entered into by two people and one ,: I 
-14-
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the frustrated parties became the complaining witnesses. 
This Court has under the former statute, Utah Code 
Annotated 76-20-8 (repealed, 1973), that if the purported 
victim gets what he has bargained for there in no actionable 
fraud or deception and the determination of this issue is 
to be made immediately after the person parts with his 
property. State v. Casperson, 71 U. 68, 262 P. 294 (1927), 
and State v. Howd, 55 Utah 927, 188 P. 628 (1920). 
Utah Code Annotated 76-6-401 (1953) defines "obtain" 
as used in the statute deficiency theft by deception to 
mean an act "to ?ring about a transfer of possession or of 
some other legally recognized interest in property ... " 
In the present case, the appellant was originally 
charged with obtaining the property of Anthony Escobar and 
Alpha Distributing Co at the close of the State's case 
the trial Court granted the defendant's motion that the 
State did not introduce a prima facie case as to Anthony 
Escobar (T.232). 
The appellant respectfully contends that the State 
did· not prove all of the elements of the offense and that 
Mr. Jiminez acted in any way to obtain money from Alpha 
Distributing. On the contrary, the appellant submits that 
the evidence did not show anything more than a risky joint 
venture which failed causing a loss to both parties. 
Mr. Escobar, as president and stockholder of Alpha 
Distributing Co. stated that he approached Mr. Jiminez with 
the idea of taking over a franchise of a bankrupt soccer 
-15-
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team, an admittedly risky venture (T.84). Mr. Escobar was 
to manage the team and stated that according to the oral ag, 
ment, he was to receive an ownership interest in the franch, 
(T. 31 and 126). He further stated that during the time 
of July and August 1976, Alpha Distributing Co. was having 
trouble paying its bills (T.102). 
On the other hand, the Tri Delta Corporation and Mr. 
Jiminez contributed about $22,000.00 to the expense of the 
ill fated soccer team (T.120 and 244). Neither he or any 
of the corporations ever received any income from the socct 
team or money from Alpha Distributipg Co., the alleged vict 
(T.252). 
Frontier U.S.A. was negotiating to obtain a franchise 
which was conditionally granted but never obtained (T.259 a 
185). The entire soccer league eventually went out of bus-
iness (T.274). 
A review of evidence by this Court will show that the 
evidence did not warrant the trial Court in allowing the 
case to be submitted to the jury. The State did not prove 
that the appellant ever obtained any property of the alle~ 
I 
victim and that this was anything more than a failed joi~ ! 
business venture. The Court should therefore reverse the 
lower Court. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant was committed in this case on the basis 
of a void Information and therefore this Court should rev~ 
the decision of the lower Court in not quashing the Infor;;I'~ 
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and order that the lower Court dismiss the Information 
and commitment entered against the appellant. Secondly, 
the State did not introduce sufficient evidence to allow 
the case to be presented to the jury; and, therefore, this 
Court should reverse the lower Court's denial of the appellant's 
Motion to Dismiss or, in the alternative award the appellant 
a new trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED 
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